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INTRODUCTION 
The United States, Canada, and Mexico have renegotiated the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For a time, the 
three-party negotiations actually broke into bilateral negotiations, 
first between the U.S. and Mexico and then between the U.S. and 
Canada. Now that the three countries have reached a new agreement, 
it is incumbent upon Congress to inquire thoroughly into the dispute 
settlement mechanisms (DSMs) contained in the United States Mex-
ico Canada Agreement (USMCA). Congress’ hearings held prior to 
approving NAFTA failed to consider serious constitutional ques-
tions, particularly about the DSMs and more generally about U.S. 
sovereignty. It is imperative that Congress not make the same mis-
take when considering approving the new USMCA. 
The most important dispute in the renegotiation over NAFTA – 
at least as between Canada and the United States – was not about 
tariffs and trade barriers themselves, but about the mechanisms for 
resolving disputes under the agreement. NAFTA’s DSMs received 
minimal mention in the U.S. media, though Canadian media were 
much more attuned to the issue. Mexico apparently also opposed 
dismantling the dispute settlement mechanism,1 but Mexico was 
                                                                                                             
*John S. Baker, Jr. is a Visiting Professor at Georgetown University Law Center 
and Professor Emeritus at Louisiana State University. He would like to thank 
Zachary Enos for his assistance on research. 
**Lindsey Keiser is a 2016 graduate of Georgetown University Law Center and 
is currently the Director of Research at the Foundation for Self Government. 
1Ana Swanson, Here’s What Canada and Mexico will Hate about Trump’s 
NAFTA Plans, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/18/heres-what-canada-and-mexico-will-
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likely more concerned about matters related to the trade imbalance 
with the United States.2 Trade between the U.S. and Canada has 
been more closely balanced—at least if you calculate both goods 
and services, rather than only goods.3 
Indeed, the U.S. “Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Rene-
gotiation”4 mostly targeted issues with Mexico, according to some 
trade experts: 
Overall, the U.S. Objectives reflect a tweaking of 
NAFTA rather than a full overhaul as Donald Trump 
had suggested as a Presidential candidate on the cam-
paign trail. In many cases, the proposed changes echo 
the provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(“TPP”) . . . . Further, the U.S. Objectives generally 
seem heavily tilted towards addressing perceived im-
balances and issues regarding the U.S. trade relation-
ship with Mexico. Many of the provisions relate to 
                                                                                                             
hate-about-trumps-nafta-plans/?utm_term=.77beedb6ebcc; Dave Graham, Mex-
ico Congress Backs Motion Defending NAFTA Dispute Mechanism, U.S. NEWS 
(July 26, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-07-26/mex-
ico-congress-backs-motion-defending-nafta-dispute-mechanism. 
 2 Joshua Partlow, As NAFTA Talks Resume, Mexicans say Trump is Wrong 
to Focus on the Deficit, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/as-nafta-talks-resume-
mexicans-say-trump-is-wrong-to-focus-on-the-deficit/2017/09/01/7a8f1294-
8ccf-11e7-9c53-6a169beb0953_story.html?utm_term=.50f63a2fc716. 
 3 There is about a $20.5 billion trade deficit with Canada in goods according 
to the Canadian government’s calculation, which is the basis for President Trump 
claiming that Canada runs a trade surplus with the United States. However, if trade 
in services is also included, then the U.S. ran a surplus of only $2.8 billion. John 
Carney, Trump’s Quarrel with Canada over Trade Numbers May Point Toward 
NAFTA Exit, BREITBART (Mar. 15, 2018), http://www.breitbart.com/big-govern-
ment/2018/03/15/trumps-quarrel-with-canada-over-trade-numbers-may-point-to-
ward-nafta-exit/. 
 4 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF 
OBJECTIVES FOR THE NAFTA RENEGOTIATIONS (July 17, 2017) (updated Nov. 
2017), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Re-
leases/Nov%20Objectives%20Update.pdf. 
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matters in which there is already a great deal of co-
herence between the stated U.S. position and current 
Canadian law.5 
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) expressed dis-
satisfaction with NAFTA’s DSMs. Yet, for the most part, the DSMs 
were retained in the USMCA. This paper contends that the uncon-
stitutionality of the binational panel system for settling disputes 
should be more apparent by now than it was when they were first 
adopted as part of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(CUSFTA) and, therefore, should have been rectified in the new 
USMCA. 
NAFTA was not a treaty, but an executive-congressional agree-
ment. This paper explains how the use of a trade agreement, rather 
than a treaty, complicates the constitutional analysis. It does not, 
however, directly consider the constitutionality of using a congres-
sional-agreement rather than a treaty.6 Part I of this paper provides 
the background for the dispute over the dispute settlement processes. 
Next, Part II addresses the constitutionality of NAFTA’s Chapters 
11 and 19 dispute settlement mechanisms as they have been carried 
over into the USMCA. Finally, in Part III, the paper discusses 
whether the USMCA represents an advance of the Rule of Law or 
only a Rule of Rules. 
I. The Dispute over Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
As between Canada and the U.S., the real stumbling block in the 
NAFTA renegotiations was not a substantive one. It concerned pro-
cess and enforcement. When disagreements occur about how one 
country interprets or enforces the provisions of the agreement, in-
cluding who will resolve the dispute and how the dispute is to be 
                                                                                                             
 5 John W. Boscariol et al, The Art of Trade: Knowing the US Position in 
NAFTA Renegotiations (July 20, 2017), http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_de-
tail.aspx?id=7371 (emphasis added). 
 6 This issue has already been discussed and written about. See, e.g., 
John Yoo, Law as Treaties: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive 
Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001); Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, 
Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1995); Lawrence H. Tribe, 
Taking Text and Structure Seriously, Reflections on Free-Form Method in Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995). 
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handled, NAFTA contained three provisions for resolving those dis-
putes – and the USMCA has largely incorporated those three provi-
sions. 
NAFTA’s Chapters 11,7 19,8 and 209 included three distinct 
DSMs. The USTR favored changes for all three. Chapter 11 pro-
                                                                                                             
 7 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Chapter 11 of NAFTA established 
procedures for settling investment disputes. To bring a claim under Chapter 11, a 
party must show it has an investment in the territory of a NAFTA country against 
whom the claim is being brought, and the party has to renounce any recourse in 
domestic courts of the country against whom the claim is brought. NAFTA art. 
1121. A Chapter 11 tribunal is made up of three arbitrators: one appointed by each 
of the disputing parties and one appointed by agreement of the disputing parties. 
NAFTA art. 1123. Any award made by the tribunal is binding on both the investor 
and the respondent party and is enforceable in domestic courts, but the awards 
under Chapter 11 are only binding between the disputing parties and with respect 
to the particular case. NAFTA art. 1136. 
 8 Chapter 19 sets out the dispute resolution process for anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties cases, allowing parties to request a binational panel review 
the case. Panels are comprised of five experts who are chosen from a roster of at 
least seventy-five people. Each party involved in the dispute selects two panelists 
either from the roster or someone who meets the criteria for roster members. See 
NAFTA Annex 1901.2. The fifth panelist is chosen by agreement of the parties. 
Chapter 19 panels are required to apply the standard of review of the country 
whose agency or law is being appealed. NAFTA art. 1904.3; NAFTA Annex 
1911. Decisions by Chapter 19 panels cannot be appealed in domestic courts. An 
appeal is only available after the final decision has been issued if 1) a panelist has 
violated specific rules of conduct, 2) the panel seriously departed from a funda-
mental rule of procedure, or 3) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, author-
ity, or jurisdiction. NAFTA art. 1904.13; see also Donald McRae and John 
Siwiec, NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Success or Failure? (2010), available at 
https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/6/2904/21.pdf (This form of 
appeal was a continuation of the “extraordinary challenge procedure in the Canada 
U.S. Free Trade Agreement). A finding of one of these does not entitle a party to 
appeal the decision in a domestic court; instead it would result in the creation of 
a new Chapter 19 panel. 
 9 Chapter 20 of NAFTA governs all disputes related to the interpretation and 
application of NAFTA. The resolution process under Chapter 20 first asks parties 
to attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution through consultations. 
NAFTA art. 2006. If no resolution can be reached, a party may request a meeting 
of the Free Trade Commission. The Commission’s sole role is to assist the parties 
in reaching an agreement; it will not rule on the dispute. NAFTA art. 2007. If still 
no resolution can be reached, a party may request arbitration by a five-member 
panel. Chapter 20 of NAFTA establishes that this five-member panel shall be 
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vided investor-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) protection for inves-
tors from one country making investments in one of the other coun-
tries. These types of arbitration provisions, widely adopted since 
1959,10 have been generally favored by business interests; opposed 
by the populist, left-wing interests;11 and should be of concern to 
those protective of state interests. While NAFTA’s ISDS did not ap-
pear to be a major focus of the Trump Administration, the USTR 
had expressed lack of support for its continuation.12 In the USMCA, 
Chapter 11 has become Chapter 14. The dispute settlement mecha-
nism of NAFTA’s Chapter 11 has been retained as between Mexico 
                                                                                                             
made up qualified panelists chosen from a roster of up to thirty individuals who 
have been appointed by consensus of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
NAFTA art. 2009. After the panel issues a final report, the parties are to agree on 
a resolution that conforms with the panel’s recommendations. However, the find-
ings of the panel are not binding, so the parties do not have to follow the exact 
recommendations of the panel. Marc Sher, Chapter 20 Dispute Resolution Under 
NAFTA: Fact or Fiction, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 10001 (2003). 
 10 David Singh Grewal, Investor Protection, National Sovereignty, and the 
Rule of Law, AMERICAN AFFAIRS (2018), https://americanaffairsjour-
nal.org/2018/02/investor-protection-national-sovereignty-rule-law/. 
 11 Id. (“While Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and other left-wing critics 
have made opposition to ISDS a part of their criticism of neoliberal trade policies, 
Republicans have tended to waffle on the issue because of its perceived benefits 
to big business.”). 
 12 Steven Trader & Caroline Simson, Lighthizer Defends Skepticism of 
NAFTA Arbitration to GOP, LAW360 (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1024510/lighthizer-defends-skepticism-of-
nafta-arbitration-to-gop (Appearing in a Congressional hearing, U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative Lighthizer suggested that in place of ISDS, “investors could invoke 
the state-to-state dispute resolution mechanism of NAFTA, or that they could in-
corporate arbitration provisions in their contracts”). But see OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FACT SHEET: INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
(ISDS) (2015), available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-of-
fice/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2018) (“For some critics there is a discomfort that ISDS provides an 
additional channel for investors to sue governments, including a belief that all 
disputes (even international law disputes) should be resolved in domestic courts. 
Others believe that ISDS could put strains on national treasuries or that ISDS 
cases are frivolous. Based on our more than two decades of experience with ISDS 
under U.S. agreements, we do not share these views. We believe that providing a 
neutral international forum to resolve investment disputes under international 
law mitigates conflicts and protects our citizens.”) (emphasis added). 
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and the United States;13 Canada, however, will be subject to the 
ISDS only for “legacy investments.”14 
The most contentious DSM, however, is Chapter 10 (formerly 
Chapter 19 in NAFTA), which deals with anti-dumping (selling be-
low cost or below the market price in the home or another country) 
and countervailing duties (imposing extra tariffs on subsidized, im-
ported goods). The U.S. and Canada were literally at loggerheads as 
to the DSM that was formerly contained in Chapter 19.15 The lan-
guage of NAFTA’s Chapter 19 was carried over almost verbatim to 
the USMCA Chapter 10 with a few new additions for digitizing fil-
ing and decisions. This paper focuses heavily on Chapter 10. 
NAFTA’s Chapter 20, the state-to-state mechanism, was rarely 
invoked;16 but the USTR proposed that it be changed from a binding 
to a non-binding process.17 Suggesting breaking the binding charac-
ter of the three DSMs, either through modification or elimination of 
the provisions, indicated concerns that the DSMs conflict with U.S. 
sovereignty. Chapter 20 is now Chapter 31 in the USMCA and the 
binding character was retained despite these concerns.18 This paper 
does not focus on the DSM in Chapter 31 (formerly Chapter 20) 
because it has not caused significant problems for the United States. 
                                                                                                             
 13 Agreement between the United States, the United Mexican States, and 
Canada, Nov. 30, 2018, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [herein-
after USMCA]. 
 14 USMCA Annex 14-C. A legacy investment is: “an investment of an inves-
tor of another Party in the territory of the Party established or acquired between 
January 1, 1994, and the date of termination of NAFTA 1994, and in existence on 
the date of entry into force of this Agreement.” 
 15 Many of the AD/CVD cases between the United States and China have 
been about lumber. See, e.g., Opinion and Order of the Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada 67, 
NAFTA Secretariat File No. ECC2004-1904-01USA (Aug. 10, 2005). 
 16 See McRae & Siwiec, supra note 8, at 371–72. 
 17 U.S. Proposes Non-Binding State-to-State Dispute Settlement Chapter in 
NAFTA, WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Oct. 15, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/trade/us-
proposes-non-binding-state-state-dispute-settlement-chapter-nafta 
 18 USMCA art. 31. 
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A. The Conflict over Settling Conflicts 
Canada desperately wants to avoid American courts. USMCA’s 
Chapter 10 - just like NAFTA’s Chapter 19 - provides that protec-
tion. The DSM in Chapter 19 predated NAFTA, having been incor-
porated at the insistence of Canada in the prior Free Trade Agree-
ment between the U.S. and Canada. Canada’s prime minister at the 
time, Brian Mulroney, was willing to walk away from the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiations if the dispute settlement 
mechanism was not included.19 In the NAFTA re-negotiations, Can-
ada insisted that the DSMs, in particular NAFTA’s Chapter 19, were 
critical to its trade relations with the United States.20 There was even 
speculation that dismantling the trade dispute settlement mecha-
nisms might be a deal breaker for Canada.21 Among the trade co-
gnoscenti in Canada, NAFTA’S Chapter 19 DSM has been consid-
ered its “Crown Jewel.”22 As one Canadian expert put it, “That’s 
why we sought a free trade agreement in the first place. It’s the dis-
pute resolution process, not low tariffs, that is the jewel in the 
NAFTA crown.”23 
Opposition to NAFTA’s Chapter 19 DSM came at least from 
some U.S. business interests.24 Canada, however, prevailed, and in 
the end, the USMCA retained the language of NAFTA’s Chapter 19 
almost verbatim. In return, Canada apparently gave ground on dairy 
                                                                                                             
 19 Chris Fournier, This Obscure NAFTA Chapter Could be Canada’s Deal 
Breaker Again, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2017), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2017-07-24/this-obscure-nafta-chapter-could-be-canada-
s-deal-breaker-again. 
 20 David Ljunggen & Andrea Hopkins, Canada Suggests it Could Quit 
NAFTA Talks over Dispute Mechanism, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-nafta-canada/canada-suggests-it-
could-quit-nafta-talks-over-dispute-mechanism-idUSKCN1AU1CK. 
 21 Fournier, supra note 19. 
 22 Jesse Snyder, The ‘Crown Jewel’ of NAFTA: Why Canada Must Fight to 
Retain Dispute Resolution Clause Despite Tough Talks, FINANCIAL POST (Oct. 
13, 2017), http://business.financialpost.com/news/the-crown-jewel-of-nafta-
why-canada-must-fight-to-retain-dispute-resolution-rule-despite-tough-talks. 
 23 Id. (quoting CIBC economist Avery Shenfield). 
 24 See, e.g., Zoltan van Heyningen, Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision Re-
inforces Doubts About Constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel System, 
Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (July 2, 2010), https://www.news-
wire.ca/news-releases/recent-us-supreme-court-decision-reinforces-doubts-
about-constitutionalityof-nafta-chapter-19-panel-system-544592012.html. 
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issues. That should have been a political win for the Trump Admin-
istration, but one that did not come home on election day in Wiscon-
sin.25 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 ISDS was added due to concerns about 
Mexico’s history of nationalization. As a result, however, the provi-
sion also applied as between Canada and the United States. This was 
the first time an ISDS provision became applicable as between two 
developed countries. Creative lawyers have attempted to use the sit-
uation against the U.S. and Canada, and although they have largely 
not been successful, these efforts pointed to a threat to U.S. and Ca-
nadian sovereignty. 26 
The attempts to use Chapter 11 have involved situations where 
a final decision by a state court in the U.S. ends up being reviewed 
by a NAFTA ISDS panel.27 State judges, in particular, have been 
                                                                                                             
 25 Perhaps partly a result of the mixed response by Wisconsin farmers to the 
new USMCA, the GOP did not perform as well as hoped in Wisconsin in the 
November 2018 elections. See Hope Kirwan, Wisconsin Farmers Weigh In On 
NAFTA Replacement, WISCONSIN PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 2, 2018), 
https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-farmers-weigh-nafta-replacement; Monica 
Davey, Tony Evers Wins Wisconsin Governor’s Race, Scott Walker Concedes, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/11/07/us/elections-wisconsin-governor-evers-walker.html. 
 26 Riyaz Dattu & Sonja Pavic, Canada Seeks to Reform NAFTA’s Investor-
state Dispute Settlement Chapter, OSLER (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.osler.com/en/resources/cross-border/2017/canada-seeks-to-reform-
nafta-s-investor-state-disp (“When the dispute settlement provisions were intro-
duced into NAFTA, it was expected that Mexico would be the country that would 
face the largest number of claims under Chapter 11. Instead, Canada has been the 
subject of the highest number of investor-state arbitration claims . . . .”); Dan 
Healing, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 Dispute Mechanism Too Costly for Canada at 
$314M, says Report, CBC (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/chap-
ter-11-report-ccpa-1.4489102 (reporting that Canada is sued more than twice as 
much as Mexico and the U.S.). 
 27 See, e.g., The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United 
States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003); 
Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 
Award (Oct. 11. 2002). See “Loewen” NAFTA Case: Foreign Corporations Un-
happy with Domestic Jury Awards in Private Contract Disputes Can Demand 
Bailout from Taxpayers, PUBLIC CITIZEN, available at https://www.citi-
zen.org/sites/default/files/loewen-case-brief-final.pdf (explaining the Loewen 
Group case series, in which the Mississippi Supreme Court made a final judgment 
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quite surprised and very concerned upon discovering that their deci-
sions are reviewable by an international tribunal.28 Though few in 
number, claims attempting to expand the reach of Chapter 11 have 
required interpretation by NAFTA’s Commission. That Chapter 11 
potentially could affect a state’s legal system was clearly not con-
sidered by the Congress.29 Chapter 11 raises constitutional questions 
about NAFTA’s impact – and now USMCA’s impact – on state and 
federal law, in particular judicial independence.30 
Chapter 11, thus, has presented a constitutional threat to judicial 
independence that should have been quite apparent. American cor-
porate interests, however, clearly favor the ISDS, at least as to Mex-
ico. That is reflected by a statement from Republican senators ob-
jecting to a statement by the USTR questioning whether ISDS 
should be continued in a renegotiated NAFTA.31 
B. Canada’s Complaint 
The Canadian concern is directed at the “bias” of U.S. federal 
courts, namely in the Court of International Trade and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The claim about federal courts 
being biased in civil litigation may shock many U.S. lawyers. Cer-
tainly, U.S. lawyers representing corporate defendants in civil liti-
gation often complain that courts in certain states are biased in favor 
of plaintiffs. Aside from ideological bias among federal judges on 
constitutional matters, however, bias in federal civil litigation as be-
tween corporations would not seem to be a matter of major concern. 
                                                                                                             
which was reviewed by a NAFTA panel, opening up the possibility that all deci-
sions by U.S. Courts – even the Supreme Court – could be reviewed by and 
changed by a NAFTA panel). 
 28 Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 18, 2004), http://www.ny-
times.com/2004/04/18/us/review-of-us-rulings-by-nafta-tribunals-stirs-wor-
ries.html. 
 29 See id. (“‘When we debated NAFTA,’ Senator John Kerry of Massachu-
setts, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, said in 2002, ‘not a single 
word was uttered in discussing Chapter 11. Why? Because we didn’t know how 
this provision would play out. No one really knew just how high the stakes would 
get.’”). 
 30 See id. (“‘This is the biggest threat to United States judicial independence 
that no one has heard of and even fewer people understand,’ said John D. Eche-
verria, a law professor at Georgetown University.”). See also infra sec. II. 
 31 Trader & Simson, supra note 12. 
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U.S. lawyers and judges, especially those who lecture around the 
world touting the federal judiciary, speak of our Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts as the “crown jewel” of the U.S. Constitu-
tion and of bias-free adjudication. 
Consider the Canadian perspective, however. In any suit against 
the U.S. Department of Commerce in the U.S. Court of International 
Trade (CIT), the odds are the U.S. will prevail. That result follows 
because the CIT is generally required to defer to the defendant-
agency’s interpretation of the laws and rules as a result of Congress 
having delegated rule-making authority to the agency. While there 
are different deference doctrines, the main one used by U.S. federal 
courts, known as Chevron deference,32 must be applied by the CIT 
as well. 
Mittal Canada v. United States,33 a case lost by Canadian chal-
lengers, grudgingly explains the standard of review the CIT is forced 
to apply: 
Mittal has filed a motion for judgment on the agency 
record under USCIT Rule 56.1 . . . .Section 706 of 
Title 5 requires a reviewing court to ‘‘hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law . . . .’’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). In this case, 
the administrative action challenged by Mittal is the 
issuance of liquidation instructions directing Cus-
toms to assess antidumping duties at the deposit rate 
in effect at the time of entry, which was 8.11 percent 
for the entries at issue. Normally, ‘‘[i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is,’’ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), but when Congress has 
cloaked an administrative agency with interpretive 
                                                                                                             
 32 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
Another deference doctrine comes from Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944) (holding that an administrative agency’s interpretative rules deserve def-
erence according to their persuasiveness). 
 33 461 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006). 
12 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 
 
authority, the federal courts’ authority is concomi-
tantly reduced.34 
The court went on to discuss the two types of deference involved 
in the case. First, the court gave the Department of Commerce def-
erence under the Chevron doctrine, meaning that because Congress 
had delegated authority to Commerce, the court must follow the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute as long as the interpretation is 
reasonable and not arbitrary.35 Finding that it was a reasonable in-
terpretation, the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation.36 The 
court also gave deference to the Department of Commerce for its 
interpretation of the agency’s own ambiguous regulation. Under the 
Seminole Rock/Auer deference doctrine, U.S. courts will only over-
turn agency interpretations of their own regulations if the interpre-
tation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.37 
Here, again, the court found that Commerce’s interpretation was 
neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, so it 
deferred to the Department of Commerce.38 To Canada, it must ap-
pear that the result is foreordained by a process biased against it. 
Federal AD/CVD litigation is biased not only against Canadian 
and Mexican parties, however. The “bias” extends, as well, to Amer-
ican parties challenging decisions of the Commerce Department and 
the International Trade Commission. In the case of Ford Motor Co. 
v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security,39 for example, Ford 
challenged a decision by the Department of Customs and Border Pa-
trol in the Court of International Trade, but the Court of International 
Trade found that the agency decision was not reviewable in the par-
ticular instance.40 The bias of deference doctrines in trade litigation 
favors the U.S. federal government, and works against private par-
ties, regardless of whether they are domestic or foreign. 
                                                                                                             
 34 Id. at 1328 (emphasis added). 
 35 Id. at 1328–29. 
 36 Id. at 1332. 
 37 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945); see 
also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 38 Mittal, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. 
 39 716 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010). 
 40 Id. 
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Moreover, as U.S. lawyers know well, deference doctrines apply 
generally in litigation challenging federal agency action. The doc-
trines do not derive from, or peculiarly relate to, trade dispute litiga-
tion. Deference to administrative agencies rests on the dubious as-
sumption that agencies have expertise which justifies Congress giv-
ing them great discretion, to which federal courts should defer.41 
That the deference doctrines apply generally to all challenges to 
agency actions is small comfort to Canadian and Mexican parties in 
trade disputes. Naturally, foreign parties will believe U.S. agency 
action favors U.S. businesses. After all, in the absence of independ-
ent judges, the general tendency of all governments will be to favor 
their own businesses. Also, in both trade and other matters addressed 
by federal agencies, U.S. corporations do have the advantage of be-
ing generally more involved in the administrative processes which 
produce the administrative decisions.42 
C. The Constitutional Issue of Federal Court Deference to 
Administrative Agency Action 
The various types of judicial deference to agency action are dic-
tated neither by the Constitution, nor the Administrative Procedure 
                                                                                                             
 41 Compare Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded 
to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer.”), with JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 416–19 (2002) (arguing that 
judicial deference of agency decisions may amount to post hoc rationalizations of 
policy preferences). 
 42 Potential influence by U.S. corporations differs as between the Department 
of Commerce and the International Trade Commission. The Department of Com-
merce’s role is more political in that it formulates and executes trade policies re-
flecting the views of the current President. As evident in the change from Presi-
dent Obama to President Trump, those policy preferences can shift quickly and 
dramatically. Nevertheless, the Department of Commerce does employ methods 
to establish the reasonableness of its decisions. Unlike the Department of Com-
merce, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) is an “independent” 
agency. Moreover, it differs from other agencies by having an equal number of 
Republican and Democrat commissioners. Other federal independent agencies 
typically have a membership split in favor of the President’s party. As a result, 
the USITC operates in a more balanced manner. See UNITED STATES 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2017). 
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Act.43 As evident from Chevron, they are judicially-created doc-
trines not based on the Administrative Procedure Act.44 These def-
erence doctrines raise much more fundamental questions with far-
reaching consequences beyond the AD/CVD DSM. 
Professor Philip Hamburger’s 2014 opus, Is Administrative Law 
Unlawful? challenges the long-held, foundational assumptions 
about Administrative Law. His work begins the chapter on “Defer-
ence” by describing how England’s James I demanded that the law 
courts defer to prerogative legislation. “The royal claim for defer-
ence to prerogative legislation rested on the king’s claim of absolute 
power.”45 Hamburger explains how America’s modern Administra-
tive State makes the same “demands for deference to administrative 
power.”46 
Without the several deference doctrines applicable in the federal 
courts, those challenging the interpretation and application of trade 
rules in the CIT and the Federal Circuit would stand on equal footing 
with the U.S. government. It is rule deference, fact deference, and 
interpretation deference, in addition to deference to administrative 
orders and warrants, that biases the process.47 
Professor Hamburger devastates long-held assumptions among 
American lawyers, professors, and judges about the Administrative 
law.48 He makes a compelling case that federal courts have abdi-
cated their constitutional duty to interpret the law.49 The process of 
appeals from administrative agencies “often has reduced the courts 
to extensions of the administrative state, nearly making the court 
proceedings yet another layer of administrative hearings.”50 Ham-
                                                                                                             
 43 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96 (2012). 
 44 See Richard O. Faulk, ’Chevron’ Deference Conflicts with the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, WLF LEGAL PULSE (Sept. 18, 2015). It does not appear from 
the language of the Administrative Procedure Act that the Court is required to 
give deference, and the Court’s decision in Chevron does not mention the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. 
 45 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 285 (2014). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 312, 319. 
 48 David E. Bernstein, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, 33 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 759, 759–60 (2015) (reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014)). 
 49 Hamburger, supra note 45, at 283–322. 
 50 Id. at 303. 
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burger is convinced – and is convincing – that eventually fundamen-
tal constitutional principles about the role of judges will require re-
consideration of Supreme Court precedents repeatedly reaffirming 
agency-deference.51 The importance of Hamburger’s work is to lay 
the intellectual foundation for the re-working of constitutional prec-
edents to reject the judicial deference to administrative agencies.52 
Justice Gorsuch is the person most likely to lead a reworking of 
the Court’s precedents related to judicial deference to administrative 
agencies. During his confirmation process, students of the Court 
quickly realized that – unlike his predecessor, Justice Scalia – Jus-
tice Gorsuch strongly believes that the deference doctrines are un-
constitutional.53 Of course, the change in one vote on the Court on 
this issue will not immediately mean that the deference doctrine will 
be de-throned anytime soon. While Justice Thomas has long ex-
pressed the opinion that the deference doctrine is unconstitutional,54 
the necessary additional three votes for a change are lacking at this 
time. 
A fundamental change in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
judicial deference to administrative agencies could take years to oc-
cur. Congress, in considering whether to approve the new USMCA, 
however, faces the immediate, practical problem of determining 
how to deal with the binational dispute-settlement mechanism 
(DSM). 
                                                                                                             
 51 Id. at 486–92. 
 52 Id. at 498 (“Once it is clear how administrative power revives absolute 
power, and how this power conflicts with the nature of American law, liberty, and 
society, one can dig into the details of how it violates the Constitution.”). 
 53 Allan Smith, Trump’s Supreme Court Nominee had his first real day of 
grilling - and there’s more to come, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/neil-gorsuch-senate-confirmation-hearing-
2017-3. 
 54 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (“The ‘judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise 
its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.’ . . . 
Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising that judgment, forcing them 
to abandon what they believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor 
of an agency’s construction. It thus wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative 
authority to ‘say what the law is’, and hands it over to the Executive.) (internal 
citations removed). 
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The DSM in Chapter 10 (formerly Chapter 19) is a constitution-
ally questionable vehicle for getting around a constitutionally ques-
tionable practice of judicial deference to administrative agencies 
D. Fixing What is Not Working 
Even if the agency-deference doctrine is constitutional and even 
it continues as to other administrative agencies, it is not working in 
the realm of AD/CVD cases. The Supreme Court’s deference doc-
trines supposedly reflect respect for the intention of Congress in as-
signing rule-making power to a particular agency55 and the expertise 
of the agencies.56 
Congress’s intention expressed in NAFTA was that the bi-
national panels apply agency deference.57 In practice, however, that 
did not happen. The binational panels may pay “lip service” to the 
deference requirement, without following it.58 Once a binational 
panel makes a decision, no possibility exists for having U.S. Su-
preme Court review.59 As to binational panels, the Supreme Court 
cannot enforce Chevron or other forms of agency deference. This 
remains true in the USMCA. 
Binational dispute panels resolve most disputes covered by 
USMCA.60 Even if a U.S. party first files in the CIT, another party 
                                                                                                             
 55 See, e.g., Mittal, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006) 
(“[W]hen Congress has cloaked an administrative agency with interpretive au-
thority, the federal courts’ authority is concomitantly reduced.”). 
 56 See, e.g., id. at 1329 (“As a general matter, Commerce is the ‘master’ of 
antidumping law, and where its rules and regulations implement a statutory pro-
vision or scheme, it is entitled to considerable deference.”). 
 57 See Patrick Macrory, NAFTA Chapter 19: A Successful Experiment in In-
ternational Trade Dispute Resolution, THE BORDER PAPERS, 4 (Sept. 2002), 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/macrorychapter19.pdf.download (explain-
ing that to prevent the binational panels from creating their own body of law, the 
U.S. negotiated to have the panels apply the domestic law of the country where 
the decision under challenge was made). 
 58 See Juscelino F. Colares & John W. Bohn, NAFTA’s Double Standards of 
Review, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 199 (2007) (arguing that NAFTA bi-
national panels have shown great deference to Canadian agency determinations, 
but have not shown the same deference to applying the standard of review of U.S. 
law) 
 59 See NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 1904, § 10. 
 60 USMCA art. 10; see Macrory, supra note 57, at 6 (“The Chapter 19 proce-
dures have been used extensively, both under the FTA and under the NAFTA. 
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can successfully request that the case be heard by a binational 
panel.61 USMCA’s binational panels – like NAFTA’s binational 
panels – will force U.S. parties into a process that deprives them of 
their access to U.S. courts and U.S. law.62 
NAFTA required binational panels to apply the law of the coun-
try applicable to the dispute,63 but they did not necessarily do so. 
The process lacks consistency because there is no “supreme court” 
to resolve conflicts among decisions. In place of appeal to a national 
court, NAFTA, and now USMCA, provides the possibility for filing 
an Extraordinary Challenge,64 which is rarely invoked. Retired U.S. 
Court of Appeals Judge Malcolm Wilkey, writing in dissent in a rare 
Extraordinary Challenge, has questioned the legitimacy of the pro-
cess: 
If this substitute appellate system had not been in-
tended to achieve similar results in applying U.S. 
law, the United States would never have agreed to it. 
The United States never contemplated that United 
States law would be changed by a binational body. If 
                                                                                                             
Indeed, almost every appeal of a US decision involving Canadian or Mexican im-
ports has been taken to a Chapter 19 panel rather than to the CIT.”). 
 61 Bhullar v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003) (hold-
ing that no statutory exception applied to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NAFTA 
binational panels, so because Canada had requested binational panel review of the 
contested determinations, the CIT no longer had jurisdiction). This decision was 
upheld on review. Bhullar v. United States, 93 Fed. Appx 218 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(holding that “the law ousts jurisdiction in the Court of International Trade to re-
view a final antidumping/countervailing duty order when binational review pro-
ceedings have been instituted under NAFTA”). See also Mitsubishi Elec. Indus. 
Canada, Inc. v. Brown, 917 F. Supp. 836, 838 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996) (finding that 
once a binational panel review has been requested, the binational panel has exclu-
sive jurisdiction). 
 62 See J. Todd Applegate, Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Are Binational Panels 
Constitutional?, 3 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 129, 141–44 (1997). 
 63 NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 1904.3; NAFTA, supra note 7, at Annex 
1911; USMCA, supra note 13, at art. 10.10. 
 64 See id. at art. 1904.11-1904.13; USMCA Annex 10-B.3. 
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the substitute appellate system does not achieve sim-
ilar results in applying U.S. law, it may not be long 
continued.65 
Ideally, a renegotiated NAFTA would have satisfied both the 
concerns of Canada about bias in any settlement process and of Con-
gress that U.S. law be followed, where applicable. At least one arti-
cle suggested making the decisions of binational panels reviewable 
by U.S. federal courts as are rulings by federal agencies.66 That, 
however, would have only compounded the structural constitutional 
problems raised by Professor Hamburger. Chapter 10 binational 
panels are not U.S. bodies. Bringing the decisions of non-U.S. pan-
els under the jurisdiction of the federal courts raises even more Ar-
ticle III issues than the NAFTA binational panels already did and 
would effectively extend the expansion of the Administrative State. 
NAFTA “suspended” the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 
1987 (CUSFTA).67 Some in Canada had argued that its Free Trade 
Agreement with the U.S. would once again become effective if 
NAFTA had simply been terminated.68 Those who actually thought 
this likely had an unwarranted belief.69 Nevertheless, such a belief 
reflected the importance that Canada places on preserving the DSM 
created in the CUSFTA and continued in NAFTA’s Chapter 19. 
To resolve the conflict over NAFTA’s Chapter 19, the U.S. 
could have agreed to eliminate the deference doctrines in AD/CVD 
cases brought under NAFTA in U.S. courts. Such a change should 
                                                                                                             
 65 Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01USA (1994) 
(Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
 66 See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 62, at 151 (suggesting that although the 
Supreme Court has not held that the availability of review by an Article III Court 
is required in every case, the Supreme Court’s positive view of appellate review 
lends “support to the position that the lack of such appellate review for binational 
panel decisions” presents constitutional problems). 
 67 See Mark Warner, Mark Warner Interviewed about the Fate of the Canada-
U.S. FTA if U.S. Withdraws from NAFTA, MAAW LAW (Aug. 14, 2016), 
http://www.maawlaw.com/tag/canada-u-s-fta/ (Canada considers the CUSFTA to 
be suspended rather than terminated). 
 68 Alexander Panetta, If NAFTA dies, the old Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment would live on, right? Not so fast Canada, FINANCIAL POST (Oct. 19, 
2017), http://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/if-nafta-dies-old-can-
ada-u-s-fta-would-live-on-right-not-so-fast-canada. 
 69 Id. 
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have satisfied any legitimate objection to litigating in U.S. federal 
courts. Without such a change, Canada understandably was able to 
insist on using binational panels, free from the American courts. 
Nevertheless, as explained below,70 the U.S. Constitution has in-
cluded alienage jurisdiction in federal courts from the outset pre-
cisely in order to assure foreigners of a fair judicial process in U.S. 
courts. 
II. The Constitutionality of Chapters 10 and 14 
The Congress that enacted NAFTA ignored the fact that Chapter 
19 was sold as CUSFTA’s “interim” solution that would allow more 
time to resolve substantive AD/CVD matters.71 Nevertheless, Chap-
ter 19, with minor changes, was carried over to NAFTA with reli-
ance on its approval as CUSFTA’s Chapter 19.72 Now Chapter 19 
has been carried over into the USMCA as Chapter 10 with only a 
few changes to update for the digital age. 
NAFTA’s ISDS in Chapter 11 effectively subjected state legis-
lation and final state court judgments to review under Chapter 11’s 
ISDS. This review process has proven to be a threat to judicial inde-
pendence.73 When asked about a particular ISDS adjudication which 
exemplified the threat, a former U.S. senator who had voted for 
NAFTA simply pleaded ignorance: “[W]e didn’t know how this 
                                                                                                             
 70 Infra sec. III(A). 
 71 See United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Bi-
national Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Cases, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1988) (prepared statement by Ms. Jean Ander-
son, Chief Counsel, U.S. Dept. Of Commerce), at 71 [hereinafter Anderson Sen-
ate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement] 
[T]he binational panel system is not, and is not intended to be, a model for future 
agreements between the United States and its other trading partners. Its workabil-
ity stems from the similarity in the U.S. and Canadian legal systems. With that 
shared legal tradition as a basis, the panel procedure is simply an interim solution 
to a complex issue in an historic agreement with our largest trading partner. 
 72 See, e.g., Zachary Jacobs, Note: One Thing is Not Like the Other: U.S. Par-
ticipation in International Tribunals and Why Chapter Nineteen of NAFTA Does 
Not Fit, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 868, 897 (2007) (citing to Congressional 
hearings on CUSFTA even when discussing Congress’ doubts about the constitu-
tionality of NAFTA). 
 73 Liptak, supra note 28. 
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provision would play out.”74 Had Congress inquired, any number of 
knowledgeable people could have explained that Chapter 11 “would 
play out” as a threat to judicial independence. 
In the new USMCA, going forward, Canadian companies will 
neither be subject to, nor be able to use offensively, Chapter 14 (for-
merly Chapter 11). The United States has maintained the ISDS dis-
pute settlement mechanism with regards to Mexico, presumably be-
cause American companies fear that Mexico’s new government may 
revive the country’s historic practice of nationalization.75 
A. Congress’ Failure to Focus on the Constitutionality of 
the DSMs in NAFTA 
Prior to the vote on NAFTA, the House held a total of 43 com-
mittee and subcommittee hearings. The Senate held 17 committee 
and subcommittee hearings. Out of this total of 61 hearings, the only 
judiciary committee hearing in either House was one by the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and 
Refugees. It addressed only immigration-related issues. A hearing 
in the House Ways and Means Committee briefly touched on the 
general issue of whether NAFTA was giving away U.S sover-
eignty.76 
Congress’ hearings on NAFTA, clearly, did not address the con-
stitutionality of Chapter 19. As carried over to Chapter 19 of 
NAFTA, the binational panel system was essentially the same as the 
dispute mechanism in the CUSFTA with a few changes.77 The rele-
vant committees apparently assumed they had adequately addressed 
                                                                                                             
 74 Id. 
 75 See Emily Pickrell, Mexico’s New President Promises More Nationalistic 
Energy Approach, BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2018), https://www.bna.com/mexicos-
new-president-n73014477039/. 
 76 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Supplemental 
Agreements to the NAFTA: Hearing before the House Comm. On Ways and 
Means and its Subcomm. On Trade, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
 77 See Barbara Bucholtz, Sawing Off the Third Branch: Precluding Judicial 
Review of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Assessments under Free Trade 
Agreements, 19 MD. J. INT’L L. 175, 192–193 (1995) (explaining that NAFTA 
replicates the FTA except in three ways: (1) the parties had to devise a “harmo-
nized system” within seven years, (2) parties have standing to assert that another 
party’s domestic law interferes with the NAFTA panel review, (3) failure to apply 
the appropriate standard of review is an explicit ground for an Extraordinary Chal-
lenge). 
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the constitutional issues when Congress considered the free trade 
agreement between Canada and the U.S. (CUSFTA).78 Thus, Con-
gress’ hearings on carrying-over Chapter 19 into NAFTA focused 
less on the legal issues and more on the human rights, environmen-
tal, labor, and economic issues that arose with the addition of Mex-
ico as part of the trade agreement.79 
Chapter 19 in CUSFTA was originally justified on grounds that 
clearly no longer applied once Mexico was included. The argument 
in CUSFTA was that Canada and the U.S. have similar legal systems 
based on the Common Law.80 NAFTA added Mexico with a very 
different legal background. Moreover, despite the similarities in law 
between the U.S. and Canada, legal disputes between Canada and 
the U.S. have become much more frequent than originally antici-
pated.81 Changes and actual experience since CUSFTA created bi-
national panels should make it plain that Congress cannot responsi-
bly ignore the DSMs in USMCA. 
1. Constitutional Confusion Caused by Non-Treaty, 
Trade Agreements 
Had NAFTA been presented as a treaty, whether or not 
CUSFTA had been a treaty, the congressional process would have 
followed a different route. Assuming that the Senate would still have 
approved NAFTA, then the legislative process of implementing it as 
a new agreement would have followed. 
                                                                                                             
 78 U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988) (Rep. Kastenmeier) [hereafter Kasten-
meier House CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing] (asking whether the CUSFTA violated 
Article III and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by failing to authorize 
judicial review or violated the Appointments Clause by having people reviewing 
the case who were not appointed by the President). A consensus among the con-
stitutional scholars and lawyers called to testify contended the provision was con-
stitutional. Only a couple scholars and two senators registered their dissents. Bu-
choltz, supra note 77 at 197 & nn.113 & 114. 
 79 Bucholtz, supra note 77, at 191. 
 80 Id. at 179; see also Anderson Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing State-
ment, supra note 71. 
 81 See Patrick Gillespie, America’s NAFTA Nemesis: Canada, not Mexico, 
CNN MONEY (Aug. 11, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/news/econ-
omy/us-canada-trade/index.html. 
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As stated above,82 this article does not directly consider the con-
stitutionality of using a congressional-executive agreement, rather 
than a treaty, to create NAFTA. Nevertheless, not using a treaty to 
enact NAFTA convoluted the constitutional issues – and the same 
issues remain for the USMCA. A treaty itself is Supreme Law of the 
Land. Unless a treaty is self-executing,83 however, it requires imple-
menting legislation before it has domestic effect.84 
A treaty, insofar as it is an agreement between the United States 
and another sovereign, cannot itself be unconstitutional. Unresolved 
is the issue of whether a treaty can provide Congress with power it 
otherwise does not possess to enact domestic law.85 But, at least as 
to non-self-executing treaties, a fairly clear line separates domestic 
law from international treaty obligations. 
The non-treaty route blurs the line between the domestic and in-
ternational spheres. Non-treaty agreements are negotiated by the Ex-
ecutive as with a treaty, but the authority of the Executive to do so 
is tied to legislation and, if the agreement is approved, is accom-
plished as a matter of legislation.86 Both the CUSFTA and NAFTA 
were followed by implementing legislation, as if they were non-self-
executing treaties. As legislation, the two trade agreements and their 
later implementing legislation were submitted to the two houses of 
Congress. A treaty would have been submitted only to the Senate. 
The House of Representatives would have a vote only on the imple-
menting legislation. Further blurring the distinction between treaty 
and legislation has been the practice of implementing so-called 
“fast-track” authority which requires an up-or-down vote, without 
amendment, in Congress. The up-or-down vote simulates the vote 
on a treaty in the Senate. But unlike a treaty, which requires approval 
by two-thirds of the senators, votes in the Senate and the House on 
trade “agreements” require only a majority to approve. 
                                                                                                             
 82 Supra Introduction. 
 83 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 84 Id. 
 85 See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2093–94 (2014) (finding that 
because Congress did not intend to reach local crimes, the Court did not have to 
make a decision as to whether the federal implementing legislation for the Con-
vention on Chemical Weapons could properly give the federal government police 
powers, which are reserved for the states. The Court does indicate that such action 
would be a “stark intrusion into traditional state authority”). 
 86 19 U.S.C.S. § 3805 (2012). 
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Like other treaty-avoiding agreements, NAFTA relied on a com-
bination of Congress’ undoubted power over foreign commerce and 
the President’s dubious, broad powers to enter non-treaty, executive 
agreements with other countries. The practice was invented by the 
Roosevelt Administration through the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments Act87 to increase presidential powers over trade88 and to go 
around the Senate’s Advice and Consent role, which requires a two-
thirds majority for approval.89 This novel mixing of Executive and 
Legislative powers has raised confusion regarding whether bi-
national panels are operating under international law only and 
whether their decisions bind the United States only as a matter of 
international law or also as a matter of domestic law.90 
                                                                                                             
 87 19 U.S.C.S. § 1351 (2012). 
 88 See generally John A. Dearborn, Institutionalizing Presidential Represen-
tation in Economic Policymaking: The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 
and the Employment Act of 1946 (2017), available at https://cpb-us-
w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/9/1833/files/2017/08/Dearborn-In-
stitutionalizing-Presidential-Representation-in-Economic-Policymaking-August-
2017-1ho4e3b.pdf (“[T]he act amounted to an attempt to institutionalize presiden-
tial representation in tariff making and alter the constitutional structure.”). 
 89 See Yoo, supra note 6, at 758. 
 90 Compare United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Bi-
national Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Cases, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1988) (testimony by John McGinnis on behalf 
of the Department of Justice) [hereinafter McGinnis Senate CUSFTA Judiciary 
Hearing Statement] 
[I]t has also been said that requiring the President to implement binational panel 
and committee decisions falls squarely within the historical tradition of United 
States reliance on international tribunals to settle claims and boundary disputes. 
This argument, based on traditional practice, is misplaced. While international 
tribunals’ decisions settling claims and boundary disputes certainly have imposed 
obligations on the United States Government as a matter of international law, 
those decisions have not, in and of themselves, imposed obligations on the United 
States Government as a matter of domestic law, 
with the testimony of Professor Andreas Lowenfeld in the same hearing (“I was 
astonished at the position presented to you a few minutes ago by the Justice De-
partment. The notion that an international agreement of the United States adopted 
by the Congress is not law is to me astonishing.”). The position stated by Mr. 
McGinnis was vindicated as to the treaties in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 
(2008). 
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2. NAFTA: More than a Simple Evolution from 
CUSFTA 
The Canada-U.S. bilateral trade agreement evolved into NAFTA 
through the non-treaty, trade-agreement process with almost no con-
sideration by Congress of its institutional impact on structural con-
stitutional issues. NAFTA (signed in 1992, approved by Congress 
in 1993, and effective January 1, 1994) marked the first time the 
U.S. participated in a multilateral trade institution. The U.S. had 
been a member of The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), signed in 1947 and effective in 1948 as a multilateral 
agreement, but one without institutions. The GATT came about after 
the post-World War II failure of countries to agree to the proposed 
International Trade Organization (ITO) (due primarily to the refusal 
of the U.S Senate)91 at the time they were creating other United Na-
tions-related institutions.92 Following NAFTA, GATT was replaced 
in 1995 by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which like the 
proposed ITO, is a permanent institution. 
The U.S. Senate failed to approve the ITO because it was con-
cerned that it represented a threat to U.S. Sovereignty.93 The initial 
post-World War II enthusiasm for a “New World Order” had been 
replaced by concerns related to the Cold War. Only after the fall of 
the Soviet Union did calls for a “New World Order” resurface. In 
between the effective dates of CUSFTA (1988) and NAFTA (1994), 
the Soviet Union officially fell apart in 1991. 
Congress failed to understand that other language in NAFTA 
meant that Chapter 19 constituted more than a simple carry-over 
from the DSM in CUSFTA. The movement from CUSFTA to 
                                                                                                             
 91 Ivan D. Trofimov, The Failure of the International Trade Organization 
(ITO): A Policy Entrepreneurship Perspective, 5 JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND LAW 
1 (2012), available at http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/arti-
cle/view/15291/10355. 
 92 See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, From the GATT to the WTO: 
A Brief Overview, guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=363556&p=4108235 (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2018) (The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference created the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (World Bank), and laid the foundations for the International Trade Or-
ganization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). 
 93 TRANSFORMATIONS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MULTINATIONALS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 38 (Sushil Vachani ed., 2006). 
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NAFTA institutionalized the regional governance of trade. The bi-
national DSM in the CUSFTA introduced what was then a novel 
element of trade governance. Thereafter, NAFTA innovated further 
in the realm of DSMs with Chapter 11. For the first time, Chapter 
11 created an Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) that could 
be applied between two developed countries, i.e., the United States 
and Canada. The reason for doing so, however, involved the partic-
ipation of Mexico in NAFTA.94 Then, the AD/CVD binational 
DSM, originally justified in the CUSFTA on the basis of the com-
mon legal systems of the US and Canada, was expanded to include 
the very different, civil-law based system of Mexico and the possi-
bility of all the civil-law countries of Latin America joining through 
accession. 
Although it did not happen, NAFTA was created with a view to 
incorporating all of the countries in the Western hemisphere.95 In 
1994, just as NAFTA became effective, trade ministers from most 
of the countries in the Americas met in Miami to discuss expanding 
NAFTA to a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).96 NAFTA’s 
text anticipated this development by including an accession clause, 
which would allow other countries to join NAFTA.97 Early on, po-
litical barriers prevented the anticipated accession of Chile.98 Since 
then, instead of accessions, the U.S. has been negotiating bilateral 
                                                                                                             
 94 Isidro Morales, The Governance of Global Issues Through Regionalism: 
NAFTA as an Interface Between Multilateral and North-South Policies (2006), 
available at project.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nakagawa/members/papers/1(5)Morales.fi-
nal.pdf. 
 95 See generally M. Jean Anderson, Implications of NAFTA’s Extension to 
Chile and Other Countries – A U.S. View, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 227 (1997), available 
at http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol23/iss/28. 
 96 Brandy A. Bayer, Expansion of NAFTA: Issues and Obstacles Regarding 
Accession by Latin American States and Associations, 26 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 615 (1997) (“In December of 1994 the leaders of thirty-four nations of the 
Western Hemisphere met at the Summit of the Americas. This conference resulted 
in a unanimous call for the creation of a “Free Trade Area of the Americas” 
(FTAA) by the year 2005.”). 
 97 NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 2204. 
 98 Bayer, supra note 96, at 634–35. 
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treaties with a number of countries in Latin America.99 The U.S. has 
definite advantages in bilateral trade agreements.100 
While the USTR, at the time, assured a member of Congress that 
NAFTA represented no infringement on U.S. sovereignty, he did 
not address the constitutional issues of the DSMs.101 In the short 
time under the CUSFTA, a bilateral treaty between two developed 
countries, major constitutional issues may not have been apparent to 
those not focused on constitutional law. The evolution of trade 
agreements, however, has been towards greater harmonization of 
law, which certainly can be a threat to sovereignty due to enforce-
ment mechanisms such as the binational panels. 
It is well to emphasize the premise upon which Chapter 19 of 
CUSFTA had been sold: it was to be only an “interim” solution be-
tween two countries having common-law legal systems.102 The ad-
dition of Mexico and potentially many other civil-law countries rep-
resented a significant change. Chapter 11 was added to NAFTA due 
to the concern about Mexico’s history of expropriations, but limiting 
Mexico’s sovereignty necessarily also limited U.S. sovereignty in a 
reciprocal way. Nevertheless, Congress gave virtually no consider-
ation to the serious constitutional issues raised by the DSMs in 
NAFTA. 
B. Unresolved Constitutional Issues 
Relatively few cases have been filed raising constitutional ques-
tions about NAFTA. One circuit court did issue a lengthy opinion 
ruling that Congress constitutionally used its power over foreign 
commerce to enact NAFTA and did not need to enter a treaty under 
                                                                                                             
 99 See Sander Levin et al, Free Trade Agreements with Latin America: A Test 
of Globalization, CARNEGIE-TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY (Mar. 14, 
2006), http://carnegietsinghua.org/2006/03/14/free-trade-agreements-with-latin-
america-test-of-globalization (noting the United States had entered into 10 bilat-
eral free trade agreements with Latin American countries by 2006). 
 100 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION (2000). 
 101 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Supplemental 
Agreements to the NAFTA: Hearing before the House Comm. On Ways and 
Means and its Subcomm. On Trade, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (testimony by 
Ambassador Michael Kantor). 
 102 See Anderson Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note 
71. 
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the Constitution treaty provision.103 But, Congress has made it par-
ticularly difficult to challenge the constitutionality of the DSMs by 
restricting the jurisdiction over any such challenge to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court.104 Several challenges 
have been filed, but none has resulted in a decision on the merits.105 
1. Chapter 14 (Formerly Chapter 11) 
As already indicated, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 was adopted without 
receiving scrutiny by Congress.106 The federal courts have also not 
scrutinized the constitutionality of Chapter 11’s DSM.107 Further-
more, Chapter 11 has rarely been the subject of commentary con-
cerning its impact on the U.S. federal system. 
Specifically, consideration has not been given to the question of 
ultimate responsibility if an ISDS panel rules against a U.S. state. 
Although no such ruling has come about, if such decision did occur, 
the question would be one of determining ultimate responsibility. 
That is to say, should the U.S. government be responsible for a 
state’s violation of NAFTA.108 Under USMCA’s Chapter 14, which 
will not apply to new investments involving Canada, such a ruling 
is much less likely. Nevertheless, if such a panel result should occur 
under USMCA’s Chapter 14, serious federalism issues would 
arise.109 
On the basis of USMCA, should Congress enact further legisla-
tion that would require a violating state to pay any ruling against the 
                                                                                                             
 103 Made in the U.S.A. Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
 104 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(A) (2012). 
 105 See, e.g., Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v. United State, 471 F.3d 1329 
(2006) (dismissing the complaint, which alleged that the binational panel of 
NAFTA violated the Constitution, for lack of jurisdiction). 
 106 See Liptak, supra note 28. 
 107 U.S. Federal Courts have heard NAFTA Chapter 11 cases, but have not 
addressed the constitutionality of Chapter 11. 
 108 See Healing, supra note 26 (The United States has won all the Chapter 11 
cases brought against it). 
 109 The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Claim, available at 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3922.pdf (“Article 105 of 
NAFTA requires the United States to ensure that its state governments comply 
with the terms of NAFTA . . . .Article 1105 of NAFTA, requires the United States 
to provide ‘full protection and security’ to investments of foreign investors, in-
cluding ‘full protection and security’ against third party misconduct.”). 
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United States? How would that square with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the 11th Amendment and the residual sovereignty 
of the states? Interestingly, Chapter 11 posed similar problems for 
the federal system of Canada, about which there has been some 
scholarly comment110 – and now Canada is not bound by the ISDS 
going forward under the USMCA. 
2. Separation of Powers and Binational Panels 
The major constitutional issues addressed in congressional hear-
ings on CUSFTA’s Chapter 19 and later in scholarly commentary 
on NAFTA’s Chapter 19 have been Article II’s Appointments 
Clause, Article III jurisdiction, Due Process and Jury Trial rights, as 
well as some references to Separation of Powers.111 The same con-
stitutional issues exist with the USMCA’s Chapter 10 because no 
substantive changes were made to the DSM. In a structural approach 
to constitutionality, Separation of Powers would rank as fundamen-
tal, with Article II (The Appointments Clause) and Article III (re-
moval of federal court jurisdiction) being considered under the gen-
eral principle of Separation of Powers. Due Process and Jury Trial 
rights would become moot if the binational DSM violates Article 
III. 
Before the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Separation of Powers 
was understood by both the Federalists and the Antifederalists to be 
the fundamental protection for liberty.112 Like British judges, federal 
judges are independent in order to administer due process and pre-
side over cases as neutral actors. Unlike British judges, however, 
this independence was the necessary condition protecting Article III 
judges in the exercise of their authority and obligation not to enforce 
legislation which contravenes the Constitution.113 
Since the Supreme Court ruled on the Watergate tapes in the 
Nixon case,114 greater attention has been given to separation of pow-
ers. The Court had handed down a number of important separation 
                                                                                                             
 110 See Rajeeve Thakur, Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the Provinces- Will the 
Constitutional Question Be Asked?, 37 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 251 (2012). 
 111 Bucholtz, supra note 77, at 197. 
 112 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 (James Madison). 
 113 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 114 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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of powers cases, some of which bear on the Article II and III issues 
raised by Chapter 10. 
a. Article II—The Appointments Clause 
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
CUSFTA, the Justice Department representative expressed the opin-
ion that the binational DSM did not pose a problem under Article III 
of the Constitution.115 Based on Buckley v. Valeo,116 however, DOJ 
thought that the binational panels, as laid out in the agreement, did 
pose a constitutional problem under the Appointments Clause. The 
decisions of the binational panels could properly bind the U.S. as a 
matter of international law. As a matter of domestic law, however, 
the binational panels could not be binding because the decision-
makers were not appointed consistent with the Constitution. 
If decisions of the binational panels were automatically binding 
as domestic law of the U.S., that would conflict with the Appoint-
ments Clause because the members of the binational panel would 
not have been appointed in conformity with the Appointments 
Clause.117 As a way of curing the problem, DOJ advised that the 
implementing legislation authorize the President to direct the appro-
priate agencies to enforce domestically the international obligations 
of the United States.118 The DOJ testimony suggested that the Pres-
ident would have to have the discretion to approve or not, but that 
                                                                                                             
 115 McGinnis Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note 90. 
 116 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding, on one of the several issues in the case, that 
the members of the Federal Election Commission must be appointed by the Pres-
ident). Mr. McGinnis also cited Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) on the 
Appointments Clause. McGinnis Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, 
supra note 90. 
 117 U.S. CONST. art II. 
 118 McGinnis Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note 90. 
The President is authorized to direct the administering authority, the Commission, 
and the U.S. customs service, as appropriate, to take necessary and appropriate 
action to implement the international obligations of the U.S. under Article 1904 
of the Agreement pursuant to a final decision of a binational panel or extraordi-
nary challenge committee. Any action taken under this authority shall not be sub-
ject to judicial review, and no U.S. court shall have power to review the determi-
nations on any question of law or fact by an action in the nature of mandamus or 
otherwise. 
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the expectation would be that he would approve virtually all of 
them.119 
The Department of Justice was not proposing that binational 
panel members be appointed by the president. It was attempting to 
avoid the situation—which has in fact resulted—that binational pan-
els composed of non-officers of the U.S. are issuing decisions which 
are binding domestically. Congress did not adopt the DOJ proposal 
or otherwise directly address the Article II problem. Instead, the im-
plementing legislation for both CUSFTA and NAFTA provided 
that, in the event that NAFTA’s Chapter 19 was held unconstitu-
tional in relation to this issue, the President was authorized to adopt 
panel decisions as his own.120 Congress also made it very difficult 
to litigate a constitutional challenge to Chapter 19.121 The constitu-
tional problem with Chapter 19 remains in USMCA’s Chapter 10. 
From Buckley to NLRB v. Canning,122 the Supreme Court has 
dealt with a series of constitutional123 challenges questioning Con-
gress’s power to control the Executive Branch.124 All but Canning 
have involved attempts by Congress to limit the president’s appoint-
ment or removal authority. Although the results in the cases may not 
be consistent, the various opinions—whether a majority, dissent, or 
concurrence—consistently turn on whether they do or do not em-
phasize the importance of the principle of separation of powers. The 
opinions stressing separation of powers did, or would, rule against 
the particular legislation. 
The separation of powers issue with regards to the binational 
panels differs in that the president’s representatives accepted the 
DSM and presented it to Congress. Rather than Congress attempting 
                                                                                                             
 119 Id. 
 120 19 U.S.C. § 1615(g)(7) (2012). 
 121 Jurisdiction over any constitutional challenge of the NAFTA DSMs is re-
stricted to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1516a(g)(4)(A) (2006). 
 122 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 123 As opposed to a question about a statutory interpretation question regard-
ing the president’s power to fill vacancies. See, e.g., NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 929 (2017). 
 124 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 
(1988); Freytag v. Comm. Of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Edmond v. 
U.S., 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Over-
sight Control Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
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to infringe on presidential power, the executive-legislative agree-
ment and fast-track processes enhance the power of the president. 
That this novel approach was agreeable to both the president and 
Congress does not dispense with a separation of powers issue, how-
ever. 
Concurring in Canning, Justice Scalia emphasized the role of 
separation of powers in protecting liberty. “Since the separation of 
powers exists for the protection of individual liberty, its vitality does 
not depend on whether the encroached-upon branch approves the 
encroachment.”125 Among the cases Justice Scalia cited is Free En-
terprise Fund. v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,126 a case 
which provides support for the argument that NAFTA’s Chapter 19 
violated the Appointments Clause. 
The binational panels created a new Appointments Clause ques-
tion just as Free Enterprise Fund had. In Free Enterprise Fund, the 
Court ruled that “dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Board 
members contravene the Constitution’s separation of powers.”127 
The Court has long upheld the ability of Congress to commit the 
initial adjudication of many matters to an Executive Branch agency 
and to restrict the President’s ability to remove the appointed offic-
ers. Free Enterprise Fund, however, refused to uphold an extension 
of such restrictions to an officer further removed from the president. 
With the binational panels, the president neither appoints nor can 
remove members on the panels, whose decisions will be binding as 
domestic law. In Free Enterprise Fund, the dual delegation occurred 
wholly within the structure of the federal government. The bi-
national panels involve a double-delegation which ends outside the 
federal government in a non-governmental binational panel.128 
                                                                                                             
 125 NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2593 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal ci-
tations removed) (citing Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 497); see also Freytag 
v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 879–80 (1991); Metropolitan Washington Air-
ports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U. S. 252, 
276–277 (1991). 
 126 561 U. S. 477 (2010). 
 127 Id. at 492. 
 128 Chapter 19 binational panels are not part of a federal administrative 
agency. The agreements explicitly provide that panel members are not members 
of the government. NAFTA Annex 1901.2(1) (“Candidates shall not be affiliated 
with a Party, and in no event shall a candidate take instructions from a Party.”). 
What occurs is a double delegation of power. Congress delegates power to the 
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The Court’s opinion in Free Enterprise Fund is narrowed to de-
claring the issue of dual for-cause removal a violation of separation 
of powers. Nevertheless, it is built on some broad language, such as 
the following, which is easily applied to the binational panels. 
A key “constitutional means” vested in the President—perhaps 
the key means—was “the power of appointing, overseeing, and con-
trolling those who execute the laws.” And while a government of 
“opposite and rival interests” may sometimes inhibit the smooth 
functioning of administration, “[t]he Framers recognized that, in the 
long term, structural protections against abuse of power were critical 
to preserving liberty . . . .”129 
Calls to abandon those protections in light of “the era’s per-
ceived necessity,” are not unusual. Nor is the argument from bureau-
cratic expertise limited only to the field of accounting. The failures 
of accounting regulation may be a “pressing national problem,” but 
“a judiciary that licensed extraconstitutional government with each 
issue of comparable gravity would, in the long run, be far worse.”130 
b. Article III: Withdrawing Jurisdiction from U.S. 
Courts 
Unlike the Free Enterprise Fund decision, Chapter 10’s bi-
national panels also raise Article III issues. The members of the bi-
national panels are not appointed by the president, but they exercise 
adjudicative power like a federal agency. Yet, their administrative-
agency-like decisions are not generally reviewable by any Article 
III court.131 Private parties to a binational panel cannot challenge the 
conduct or the constitutionality of the panel process. Only one of the 
countries can file an “Extraordinary Challenge” to a particular panel. 
As indicated by the choice of the word “Extraordinary,” this “ap-
peal” has been extremely rare. Effectively, a private party does not, 
                                                                                                             
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to select individuals to be on the roster to 
serve on the NAFTA binational panels. Congress further delegated power by giv-
ing oversight of these panels to a Secretariat. United States-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 1851 Sec. 405(e); North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 107 Stat. 2057 Sec. 105(a). 
 129 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 480 (internal citations removed). 
 130 Id. at 501 (internal citations removed). 
 131 NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 1904. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 33 
 
in practice, even benefit indirectly by this rarely used appeal. Fur-
thermore, judicial review of the results of the binational panels is 
generally prohibited. In an attempt to avoid the claim that Congress 
has violated separation of powers by precluding constitutional re-
view, the statue limits jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to 
NAFTA to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.132 
The statute also restricts standing beyond the Article III require-
ment.133 
1) International versus Domestic Law 
At the time of CUSFTA, the Justice Department, and others re-
jecting the Article III challenges to the binational panels, took the 
position that the history of U.S. participation in international tribu-
nals and boundary disputes meant that there was no Article III ob-
jection to the binational panels. As the Justice Department pointed 
out, however, those tribunals only settled U.S. obligations as a mat-
ter of international law,134 which was the basis for its concerns, dis-
cussed above, about the Appointments Clause.135 
Given that Congress failed to correct the Appointments Clause 
problem, the result is that international binational panels are making 
decisions that have the effect of binding domestic law in the United 
States and are not subject to judicial review. There is no precedent 
suggesting that such an arrangement can possibly comport with our 
Constitution. 
Congress’s creation of the binational panels has rightly been re-
ferred to, repeatedly, as “unique” because to require U.S. citizens to 
go to an international body in order to assert claims under U.S. law 
would previously have been unthinkable. 
In CUSFTA, the political branches agreed to a power-sharing 
arrangement with Canada that took AD/CVD matters away from the 
                                                                                                             
 132 19 U.S.C.A. s 1516a(g)(4)(A). 
 133 American Coalition for Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 F.3d 761 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (“Under the NAFTA Act, 19 U.S.C.A. s 1516a(g)(4)(C) (Supp. 1997), 
‘an interested party’ that participated in a binational review panel proceeding may 
commence such a constitutional challenge ‘within 30 days after the date of publi-
cation in the Federal Register of notice that binational panel review has been com-
pleted.’”). 
 134 See McGinnis Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note 
90. 
 135 Supra Sec. II(B)(2). 
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jurisdiction of the CIT, an article III court. The Congress need not 
have made the CIT an Article III court with jurisdiction over 
AD/CVD cases. For a long period, AD/CVD disputes did not go to 
an Article III court.136 In the past, AD/CVD matters were handled 
within the Executive branch. 
Although it did not have to, Congress later created the CIT as an 
Article III court and gave jurisdiction over AD/CVD matters. When 
CUSFTA came along, Congress removed jurisdiction from CIT. But 
it did not simply legislate taking away CIT jurisdiction and, for ex-
ample, returning to a previous way of handling AD/CVD matters. 
Instead, it sent these matters to an international body. That choice 
was not one that is constitutionally permissible. 
2) Exceptions to Article III 
The Supreme Court has recognized certain exceptions which al-
low Congress to commit adjudication to non-Article III courts. 
These fall into two general categories: So-called “public rights” leg-
islative courts and adjuncts to Article III courts.137 “Public rights” 
matters, which Congress could have handled itself without involve-
ment of courts, are one of the classes of disputes that have been al-
lowed to be placed in legislative courts.138 As generally defined, a 
“public rights” dispute must involve the federal government as a 
party.139 Accordingly, AD/CVD would fall under the public rights 
doctrine. 
The Supreme Court’s cases on the relationship between legisla-
tive courts and Article III courts has been anything but clear and 
consistent. In 1982, the Supreme Court handed down the Northern 
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. decision,140 a plu-
rality opinion which held that Congress could not assign broad ad-
judicative powers to non-Article III bankruptcy judges. The case ap-
                                                                                                             
 136 See Anderson Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note 
71. 
 137 See generally, Andrew Nolan and Richard M. Thompson, Congressional 
Power to Create Federal Courts: A Legal Review, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE (Oct. 1, 2014). 
 138 Id. at 17. 
 139 Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring). 
 140 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
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peared that it might be a landmark case, highly restrictive of excep-
tions to Article III jurisdiction. The Court identified only three cat-
egories of cases where it was permissible to assign disputes to non-
Article III judges.141 
Between 1982 and the CUSFTA hearings in 1988, however, a 
substantial majority of the Court took a much more functional ap-
proach in two cases, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod-
ucts142 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,143 
and refused to extend Northern Pipeline. At that point, the Congress 
may have thought the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence indicated a 
general willingness to uphold exceptions to Article III jurisdiction 
that Congress considered “necessary and proper.” 
In 1989, after the CUSFTA hearings, Justice Brennan wrote a 
majority opinion seemingly giving new life to Northern Pipeline.144 
Since then, the Court has addressed Article III issues in the context 
of bankruptcy in two important decisions on the ability of Congress 
to avoid Article III courts. In Stern v. Marshall145 (holding the Bank-
ruptcy Court had statutory authority, but not constitutional author-
ity) and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif146 (holding 
Article III is not violated when parties knowingly and voluntarily 
consent to a bankruptcy court). As the unanimous opinion in Well-
ness International began: 
Congress’ efforts to align the responsibilities of non-
Article III judges with the boundaries set by the Con-
stitution have not always been successful. In North-
ern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
and more recently in Stern, this Court held that Con-
gress violated Article III by authorizing bankruptcy 
judges to decide certain claims for which litigants are 
                                                                                                             
 141 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64-67 (Justice Brennan noted Congress has 
created legislative territorial courts, military courts, and courts that adjudicate 
public rights). 
 142 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
 143 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 144 Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 145 564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
 146 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
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constitutionally entitled to an Article III adjudica-
tion.147 
3) Exceptions to Article III Do Not Include Giving 
Jurisdiction to an International Body 
Although Congress has broad authority in legislating on all 
kinds of matters, the Constitution constrains how it does so. INS v. 
Chadha,148 for example, involves congressional legislation that cre-
ated a deportation process for aliens and also gave the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service power to suspend deportations under cer-
tain circumstances. But Congress also reserved to itself a “legisla-
tive veto” which could be exercised if members of one House of 
Congress disagreed with a particular decision suspending a deporta-
tion. Having given the power to an Executive agency, Congress 
could not take away that power without going through the constitu-
tionally mandated process for enacting and amending laws. 
Consistent with Separation of Powers and Article III, Congress 
has power to exercise a degree of control over when and where U.S. 
citizens have access to federal courts. Article III leaves to Congress 
discretion whether to create lower federal courts and which ones.149 
Had Congress not created any lower federal courts, almost all litiga-
tion would have come initially through state courts. Congress has 
long regulated the minimum amount in controversy required to file 
in federal court and the ability to remove cases from state court.150 
The Supreme Court has also upheld the power of Congress to 
keep U.S. citizens out of both state and federal courts under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act,151 but only if the parties “consent” in some 
form to binding arbitration. The Supreme Court has repeatedly re-
buffed state attempts to legislate around the Federal Arbitration 
Act.152 Analogies between consensual arbitration and the binational 
                                                                                                             
 147 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015) (internal citations removed). 
 148  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 149 U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 150 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 151 The United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1–16 (1925) (more com-
monly referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act). 
 152 See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keat-
ing, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
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panels fail, however, because all AD/CVD challenges must go to the 
binational panels, regardless of the parties’ consent. 
In certain situations, the disputants’ consent does not matter. The 
Court has allowed Congress to require citizens and others—without 
their consent—to go first through the administrative agency process. 
Although they are deprived (Hamburger would argue, unconstitu-
tionally153), of the right to jury trial, they are not completely barred 
from access to an Article III court because they are able to appeal to 
an Article III court.154 The Executive can send U.S. citizens for trial 
in another country in which the accused is alleged to have commit-
ted a crime, but doing so is based on the Constitution’s Extradition 
Clause,155 an extradition treaty with the other country, and the right 
to an extradition hearing in federal court.156 In none of these situa-
tions is access to at least one federal court precluded. 
Neither Congress nor the President, however, can constitution-
ally force a U.S. citizen to submit to adjudication by a non-U.S. pro-
cess of adjudication for acts occurring within the jurisdiction of the 
U.S. Although a criminal case, Reid v. Covert is strong authority for 
the proposition that U.S. citizens cannot be forced into a non-U.S. 
adjudication for actions taken under U.S. jurisdiction.157 
As the Customs and International Trade Association Bar stated 
in its submission against the binational panels, 
We are not aware of any precedent where the United 
States has statutorily agreed to force its citizens or 
those entitled to the protection of its laws to go to a 
binational panel to construe United States laws and 
Federal agencies actions with the ultimate determi-
nation of those rights or obligations under United 
States statutes in that binational panel.158 
                                                                                                             
 153 Hamburger, supra note 45, at 154–55. 
 154 See Cox. v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947); see also Hamburger, supra 
note 45, at 303. 
 155 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
 156 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 157 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (finding that an agreement with a foreign nation does 
not confer any new jurisdiction which would be “free from the constraints of the 
Constitution”). 
 158 Bucholtz, supra note 77, at 199. 
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Despite what might be termed a “flexible” view of separation of 
powers, the majority opinion in Wellness International Network pro-
vides support for the view that Congress cannot force parties into 
binational panels without their consent. The opinion clearly notes 
that consent is required for adjudication before a non-Article III 
court. 
In sum, the cases in which this Court has found a vi-
olation of a litigant’s right to an Article III deci-
sionmaker have involved an objecting defendant 
forced to litigate involuntarily before a non-Article 
III court. The Court has never done what Sharif and 
the principal dissent would have us do – hold that a 
litigant who has the right to an Article III court may 
not waive that right through his consent.159 
III. The Constitutional Tension Between Sovereignty and 
Harmonization of Trade Law 
Harmonization of commercial law generally is a worthwhile en-
deavor. Such harmonization certainly facilitates trade. Voluntary 
adoption of the U.C.C. by all the states in the U.S. demonstrates that 
the desire for increased trade can produce a high degree of harmo-
nization of commercial law. Due to some variations among the 
states, the harmonization brought about by the U.C.C. is not perfect. 
Moreover, state and federal courts interpret the law as adopted in 
each particular state, which may or may not conform to the interpre-
tation of the same provision in other states. To achieve perfect har-
monization, the U.C.C. would have to be a federal law and, there-
fore, subject to authoritative interpretation by the Supreme Court, 
which current precedent precludes.160 
The U.C.C. has served as a model for international model laws, 
including Article 9’s influence on the Organization of American 
                                                                                                             
 159 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1947 (2015). 
 160 The creation of the U.S.C. as a model law for the states came about after 
the Supreme Court, in Erie R.R. v Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), over-ruled 
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), and stated that “Congress has no power to de-
clare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local 
in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. 
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal 
courts.” 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 39 
 
States model law and, in turn, Mexico’s law on secured lending.161 
This work has been led by the National Law Center for Inter-Amer-
ican Free Trade (NLCIFT), a private non-profit organization, which 
has been engaged in harmonization and trade promotion efforts 
since 1992.162 NLCIFT’s work supported implementation of 
NAFTA and, later, the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA).163 Working with private parties, the U.S. State Depart-
ment, USAID, and various countries in the Americas, NLCIFT has 
assisted a number of countries in the Americas to draft commercial 
law-reform legislation. NLCIFT has also encouraged and trained 
private parties voluntarily to use arbitration as an alternative dispute 
mechanism. Most importantly, this process involves voluntary ac-
tions by the various governments; the governments do not give up 
their sovereign right to legislate and adjudicate. 
The U.C.C. is compatible with the federal form of the United 
States, in which states retain residual sovereignty over much of their 
law. The Constitution’s structure encourages, but does not itself 
force, harmonization. It leaves to Congress the power to decide 
whether and how much of commercial law to harmonize. The text 
of the Constitution itself (as opposed to the Court’s invention of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause) lays down the few basic principles nec-
essary to facilitate trade and creates the institutional process for leg-
islating and enforcing the rules, but leaves substantive matters to the 
congressional process. 
The Constitution modified the federal form from what we now 
call confederalism to federalism. Among other problems, delegates 
came to the Constitutional Convention to deal with disruptions in 
trade and commerce caused by various states. The Philadelphia Con-
                                                                                                             
 161 See BORIS KOZOLCHYK, COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: LAW, 
CULTURE, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 73-75 (2014); see also D. Michael 
Mandig, Secured Lending Reform in Latin America: A Practitioner’s Point of 
View on Mexico, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2011). 
 162 NATIONAL LAW CENTER FOR INTER-AMERICAN FREE TRADE, 
http://natlaw.com/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
 163 The author was a member of a team of consultants, led by NLCIFT, work-
ing for USAID on the implementation of CAFTA. (Later, the Dominican Repub-
lic joined the agreement which then became known as DR-CAFTA). The author’s 
area of responsibility for the report on the CAFTA countries related to the judici-
ary and alternative dispute resolution. 
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vention followed a year after the failure of the Annapolis Conven-
tion in 1786, which had been called to consider commercial issues. 
The Articles of Confederation did provide for the free movement of 
commerce from one state to another and provide citizens of each 
state the privilege of trading in other states on the same terms as 
citizens of those states.164 Each state, however, retained its full sov-
ereignty.165 The United States then had a Congress, but no executive 
or federal judiciary to enforce the Articles. The structure created by 
the Constitution would free up the flow of trade and commerce. 
A. How the Constitution Frees Commerce Among the 
States 
The Constitution frees up the flow of commerce even without 
Congress passing legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Ar-
ticle I, Section 10 does much to prevent states from interfering with 
the movement of commerce from one state to others.166 It prohibits 
states from 1) manipulating money and impairing contract rights; 2) 
entering treaties, alliances or confederations, which would include 
                                                                                                             
 164 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV, 
the free inhabitants of each of these States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges 
and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State 
shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein 
all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, 
and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively . . . . 
 165 Id. at art. II (“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independ-
ence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation 
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”). 
 166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 
No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of 
marque and  reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but 
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex 
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of 
nobility. 
No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on 
imports  or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s 
inspection laws: and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any state 
on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and 
all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. 
No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep 
troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with 
another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, 
or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. 
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trade agreements with each other or foreign nations; and 3) imposing 
imposts or duties (tariffs) on imports or exports, except as absolutely 
necessary for executing their inspection law and except as allowed 
and controlled by Congress. 
Other parts of Article I, Section 10 deal with war. As discussed 
early in The Federalist,167 guarding against the potential for war 
with other countries and between states is a major motivator for cre-
ating “a more perfect Union.”168 The Federalist understands that 
commercial rivalries between countries can be a common cause for 
war.169 A superintending power over commerce among the states 
benefits not only the economic well-being of the country, but pro-
vides the tax revenue for a strong Union to defend against commer-
cial and military aggression. 
The Constitution does not simply give an existing government 
more power; no central government existed prior to the Constitution. 
A treaty/confederation is not a government, as The Federalist ex-
plains.170 For the first time, the Constitution created a government 
for the United States. The federal government is a power that can 
act directly on citizens, as long as it does so within its enumerated 
powers. In confederations, like our Articles of Confederation and 
the European Union, the central power can only act on the constitu-
ent states, not directly on citizens.171 Compare the difference on 
taxes: under the Articles, Congress could not tax directly but had to 
request funds from the states. For better or worse, the federal gov-
ernment directly imposes and collects taxes on individuals and busi-
nesses. 
To move from the Confederation to a government, the Constitu-
tion added what the Articles lacked: executive power vested in a 
president and judicial power vested in a supreme court “and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”172 The establishment of the system of lower federal 
courts was controversial. Madison, who wanted lower courts to be 
established in the Constitution, had to compromise by leaving it to 
                                                                                                             
 167 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2-8. 
 168 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 169 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay). 
 170 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 171 See id. 
 172 U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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Congress. Fortunately, the first Congress established some lower 
federal courts.173 
Creation of the lower federal courts, along with diversity juris-
diction, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause174 was intended 
to protect and facilitate commerce among the states.175 Some law-
yers and judges have questioned the continued need for diversity 
jurisdiction.176 They apparently think that the proper role for federal 
courts is to focus primarily on issues under the Bill of Rights, rather 
than on commercial matters which fall into federal courts simply 
because the parties are citizens of different states. 
The Framers focused considerable attention on the conflicts 
among competing factions –notably those based on different eco-
nomic interests such as debtors and creditors.177 They had witnessed 
the populist passions of debtor-dominated state politics. They, there-
fore, designed a modern federal republic that would avoid the fatal 
flaws of the ancient republics.178 That meant structuring the govern-
ment on the pillars of separation of powers and federalism.179 Issues 
of federalism and separation of powers involving trade and com-
merce were the basis for some of the most important and controver-
sial cases of the 19th century.180 
Diversity jurisdiction, along with the related alienage jurisdic-
tion,181 has been key to the commercial success of the United States. 
Access to lower federal courts, with Article III judges, has meant 
that out-of-state and out-of-country investors could have confidence 
of being judged in a neutral forum. Even with juries drawn from the 
                                                                                                             
 173 An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States (more com-
monly called the Judiciary Act of 1789), available at https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=196. 
 174 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 175 Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992). 
 176 See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 
WASH. U. L. Q. 119 (2003). 
 177 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 178 See id. 
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 180 See John Marshall and the Bank Case: McCulloch v. Maryland, 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION 4 (2012), available at http://www.crf-
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surrounding the decision). 
 181 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
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local population, Article III courts minimize the opportunities for 
getting “home-cooked” in a state court deferential to interests of lo-
cal voters. Unfortunately, some federal judges do not appreciate that 
their existence greatly reduces the risks of doing business through-
out the United States.182 
The integrity of any country’s courts is not merely a domestic 
issue; it affects the attractiveness of a country to foreign investment. 
Affording aliens access to federal courts, however, not only facili-
tates trade. The lower federal courts are necessary to assure foreign-
ers more generally that they will receive fair treatment. The Feder-
alist explains the reasons, including avoiding war, why “the federal 
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citi-
zens of other countries are concerned.”183 
It was not long after adoption of the Constitution that equal treat-
ment for aliens as to jurisdiction was put to a major test. The dispute 
ultimately produced the famous 1816 case of Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee,184 which confirmed the authority of the Supreme Court to 
review final judgments of state courts on issues interpreting treaties 
and the Constitution. The case, however, began in 1794 as a dispute 
over conflicting claims to lands, arising because Virginia had en-
acted a statute allowing confiscation of Loyalist property. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court upheld the confiscation, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed in Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee (1813).185 It held 
that the matter fell within the terms of the Jay Treaty. 
                                                                                                             
 182 Investors and businesses generally decide where to invest or locate their 
businesses based on an assessment of the opportunities and risks of particular lo-
cations. One of those risks relates to the court system. In the U.S., certain state 
court systems are viewed as negative factors, but the ability to access a federal 
court minimizes the risk. Overall, the U.S. civil justice system is viewed as con-
sistent with the Rule of Law. 
 183 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) 
The peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part. The union 
will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. 
And the responsibility for an injury, ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty 
of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, 
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judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other 
countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public 
faith, than to the security of the public tranquility. (emphasis added). 
 184 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
 185 11 U.S. 603 (1813). 
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What has generally separated the U.S. legal system from many 
countries has been its equal access for, and fair treatment of, foreign 
parties in federal court.186 Foreign parties often prefer to litigate in 
the U.S. federal court system, rather than in their home-country 
courts. On the other hand, American corporations contracting with 
foreign parties often specify that any litigation will occur in a U.S. 
court or that any disputes will be resolved through arbitration. 
Among other reasons, corporations choose to do so due to the cor-
ruption of many court systems around the world. 
B. NAFTA/USMCA and Harmonization: The Triumph of 
Hope over Sovereignty? 
Efforts at harmonization and unification of commercial law have 
been developing since the nineteenth century.187 The success of the 
United States in moving from a confederation to a federal-state Con-
stitution to create a largely free-trade, internal market had some im-
pact on this movement. Since the 1980’s, the efforts at harmoniza-
tion and unification have increased through bilateral and regional 
trade agreements.188 They have encouraged visions of ever expand-
ing harmonization. At least prior to recent political developments in 
the West, those hoping for global harmonization seemed to be riding 
the wave of history. 
Complete harmonization of trade law, however, is an extremely 
complicated, and possibly futile, exercise.189 Multilateral trade 
agreements require complex harmonization of the trade-related laws 
of all countries involved.190 Recall that the binational panel provi-
sion was supposed to be an “interim” solution in order to allow the 
                                                                                                             
 186 See CREDENDO, https://www.credendo.com/country_risk/united-states 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (evaluating countries according to business risks and 
scoring the United States as low risk). 
 187 JUNJI NAKAGAWA, INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF ECONOMIC 
REGULATION (2011). 
 188 Id. 
 189 See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in In-
ternational Commercial Law, University of Virginia School of Law Legal Studies 
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 190 See Craig L. Jackson, The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas and Le-
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U.S. and Canada more time to harmonize their AD/CVD laws.191 
That harmonization on one area of law between only two countries 
did not occur. Instead, the interim solution of the binational panels 
carried forward into NAFTA and now into USMCA. 
The Trade Act of 1974 authorized the President “to harmonize, 
reduce or eliminate barriers” which are deemed to place an undue 
burden on our trade with other nations.192 Harmonization of com-
mercial law is a matter of degree, however. It need not be as com-
prehensive as that of the European Union, which aims at unification. 
Those driving ever-more comprehensive harmonization are econo-
mists and multinational corporations. Neither pay much, if any at-
tention, to law in general or to the Constitution in particular. 
Congress does not possess the power to regulate commerce 
among foreign nations. That would be a superintending power. Con-
gress does have a superintending power to regulate commerce 
among the states. The original meaning of “to regulate” is “to make 
regular”193 and “to make regular” is a synonym for “harmonize.”194 
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to “make 
regular,” i.e., to “harmonize,” commerce among the states. 
At least prior to the emergence of the Administrative State, how-
ever, the degree of harmonization was always dependent on the will-
ingness of the people, acting through their representatives in Con-
gress, to do so. But the degree to which Congress has been willing 
to regularize commerce, while increasing over time, has been insuf-
ficient for those who would like Congress to preempt virtually every 
state law seen as a barrier to commerce.195 
Congress’ ability to harmonize commerce or trade with other na-
tions depends on reciprocal consent. Accordingly, Congress’ power 
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sues/preemption-federalism (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
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with respect to international trade is to regulate commerce “with” 
foreign nations. That language reflects the equal status of sovereign 
states. Trade agreements, beginning with CUSFTA and NAFTA and 
now USMCA, embody provisions like Chapter 19 and Chapter 10 
in order to avoid dependence on the continued willingness of each 
sovereign to cooperate with one or more other sovereigns. 
The sovereign nations of Europe have mostly transferred power 
over trade to institutions of the European Union (EU). Nevertheless, 
they remain essentially sovereign as long as each can legally with-
draw from the EU, as Britain has voted to do. Even without exercis-
ing their right to withdraw, EU countries remain sovereign as long 
as they control their own military forces. The EU is not a state, but 
a confederation created by successive treaties. 
The Federalist recognizes that confederations have a certain util-
ity for specific, limited purposes: 
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea 
of a league or alliance between independent nations 
for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a 
treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circum-
stance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discre-
tion; and depending for its execution on the good 
faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist 
among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vi-
cissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-
observance, as the interests or passions of the con-
tracting powers dictate.196 
As the history of the European treaties culminating in the EU 
and now Brexit demonstrates, the continued existence of individual, 
equal sovereigns prevents permanent, complete integration of a 
multi-state economy. Nevertheless, trade agreements have taken in-
spiration from the EU in moving to create permanent, superintend-
ing institutions, such as, most prominently, the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO)—the reincarnation of the failed ITO. Without a sov-
ereign or a superintending institution with enforcement powers, the 
degree of harmonization will continue to depend on the wills of the 
sovereigns involved. 
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“The impulse to reduce diversity among the legal systems gov-
erning commerce has manifested itself for as long as people have 
traded across political boundaries.”197 The efforts from ancient 
Rome, to the United States, to the European Union,198 “involve the 
imposition of a unified body of rules by an institution with at least 
some sovereign powers, or the creation of coherent rules in the ab-
sence of any nation state.”199 
At some point, harmonization of commercial law comes into 
conflict with sovereignty. Beyond that point, further harmonization 
depends on the transfer of some sovereign powers over trade to a 
superintending institution, as occurred in the EU. Still, as Alan 
Holmer, the U.S. Trade Representative at the time, stated in his tes-
timony on CUSFTA, “[t]here never has been, and likely never will 
be, perfectly free trade between any two independent sovereign 
countries.”200 
C. NAFTA/USMCA’s Significance for the Regional and 
Global Governance of Trade 
As a superintending authority, NAFTA may have appeared to be 
relatively mild,201 but it launched the United States into the regional 
development of global governance.202 Of course, CUSFTA first fa-
                                                                                                             
 197 Stephan supra note 189, at 3. 
 198 Id. at 3–4. 
 199 Id. at 4. 
 200 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational 
Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 100th 
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cilitated this development by initiating the binational panels. Never-
theless, while CUSFTA stated that one of its objectives would be to 
“lay the foundation for further bilateral and multilateral” coopera-
tion,”203 it contained no accession agreement. NAFTA, on the other 
hand, contained an accession agreement which reflected a re-
worded objective to “establish a framework for further trilateral, 
regional and multilateral cooperation.”204 USMCA has similar lan-
guage.205 
The U.S. did not follow through with its CUSFTA commitment 
to harmonize AD/CVD laws with Canada.206 The Congress that 
passed CUSFTA could not bind a future Congress in our constitu-
tional system.207 The CUSFTA legislation did bind the federal judi-
ciary, absent a declaration that the binational panels are unconstitu-
tional. Although explicitly explained as not a model for future trade 
agreements,208 the binational panels became another one of those 
government programs that never seems to go away. 
It was the hope of a prominent international law scholar that the 
binational panels would be a model and influence U.S. courts: 
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 203 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, art. 102(e), Jan. 2, 1988 (emphasis 
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I think one can look forward to gradual harmoniza-
tion of the perceptions and practices of the two na-
tions as the body of precedent builds up in the deci-
sions of the binational panels. I would hope, in fact, 
that U.S. courts in cases not covered by the panel 
would – and I think the legislation ought to say 
“should” – look at the recent opinions of the pan-
els.209 
NAFTA superseded CUSFTA and became “a key strategy for 
advancing and expanding a regulatory framework for global gov-
ernance.”210 Supposedly, the United States thereby ensured that its 
priorities would prevail.211 The United States’ involvement in global 
governance, however, has de-prioritized the Constitution. 
Alan Wm. Wolf, now Deputy Director of the WTO, has de-
scribed the U.S.-driven legal framework for international trade and 
the significance of NAFTA.212 He explains that the process began 
with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934213 and acquired 
its vision in language found in the Atlantic Charter by which Roo-
sevelt and Churchill committed their countries “to further the enjoy-
ment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, 
on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world 
which are needed for their economic prosperity;” and stated their 
desire “to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations 
in the economic field.”214 According to Wolf, 
                                                                                                             
 209 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Senate 
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From these beginnings, parallel tracks continued to 
be taken over the next three quarters of a century -- 
with enactment of a number of statutory compacts 
between the President and the Congress loosely 
termed “trade negotiating authority” and in an itera-
tive process of multilateral negotiations to construct 
a rules-based world trading system -- first in the Ha-
vana Charter for an International Trade Organization 
(the ITO, that the U.S. did not ratify), but then in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
which the Executive Branch forged ahead with with-
out the express approval of Congress until the 1970s, 
and finally the creation of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) in the Uruguay Round in 1994. 
These two elemental legal foundations, domestic 
statutes and multilateral rules, with the addition of 
some free trade agreements -- most prominently 
NAFTA, are the legal framework for America’s con-
duct of international trade.215 
D. The Rule of Law or The Rule of Rules? 
Wolf continued by emphasizing that “[t]he rule of law must gov-
ern what our government can and should do in the field of interna-
tional trade.”216 He rightly said this occurs “through our interven-
tions before administrative and policy agencies of the Executive 
Branch, through appearances before Congress and the International 
Trade Commission, before U.S. courts and international tribunals, 
and in the press.”217 Unfortunately, prior to the adoption of NAFTA, 
virtually none of that legal scrutiny was applied to the DSMs. This, 
despite what Wolf explained, has been the significance of NAFTA 
in shaping the global governance of trade. 
For the U.S., the Constitution embodies our application of The 
Rule of Law. To violate the Constitution in pursuit of a global set of 
trade rules does not advance the Rule of Law. Although trade law 
experts may mouth the phrase “Rule of Law,” too often what they 
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really are promoting is the rule of rules. These are very complicated 
rules that allows a small number of trade-law specialists to make 
politically unaccountable decisions that extend the Administrative 
State to the global level. 
The Rule of Law involves both an ideal and its actual instantia-
tion in particular countries. The ideal—sought but never fully 
achieved—refers to principles of justice that restrain the exercise of 
governmental power. As an actual state of affairs, the Rule of Law 
can only exist within the bounds of a particular political body with 
powers to enforce the rules of law.218 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the ideal of the Rule of 
Law—so prominent in the Declaration of Independence—was wide-
spread. Regardless of whether and to what extent the rule of law 
existed within the borders of the separate states,219 it did not in fact 
exist among the whole group of states. Certainly, on matters of trade, 
states were not adhering to the provisions of the Articles.220 The Ar-
ticles could not enforce the Rule of Law because it did not provide 
for executive and judicial powers to do so. 
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communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of 
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 219 For a description of the lawlessness in some states, see Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farms, 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
 220 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1786) in HANK 
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Some may think that multilateral agreements are a modern de-
velopment, widely used only since after World War II. While sig-
nificant since World War II, the Constitution’s Framers were quite 
familiar with such arrangements and rejected them. Federalist 15 
explains that experience shows that such arrangements fail to pro-
duce the expected benefits. 
In the early part of the present century there was an 
epidemical rage in Europe for this species of com-
pacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly 
hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a 
view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the 
peace of that part of the world, all the resources of 
negotiation were exhausted, and triple and quadruple 
alliances were formed; but they were scarcely 
formed before they were broken, giving an instruc-
tive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little de-
pendence is to be placed on treaties which have no 
other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and 
which oppose general considerations of peace and 
justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or 
passion.221 
The European Union is an expansion of its 18th century prede-
cessors. It has sought to overcome the weakness of previous confed-
erations lacking judicial and executive powers by adding a powerful 
European Court of Justice and the European Commission. Still, it 
has been experiencing the limitations described by The Federalist. 
More recently, the EU has attempted unsuccessfully to move from a 
multilateral-treaty/confederation to a constitution.222 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                             
on foot a retaliation of the policy of Great Britain, Connecticut declared her ports 
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 221 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 170. 
 222 Andrea Broughton, European Council Fails to Agree on a Constitutional 
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as a confederation, the European Union remains inherently unstable, 
as demonstrated by Brexit and the bailout of Greece.223 
 NAFTA and the WTO were created around the time of the 
expansion and transition of the European Economic Community 
into the European Union. Those were heady days. Unfortunately, 
the creation of the EU inspired, in part, NAFTA and the WTO – and 
now the USMCA – to include semi-governmental features which 
collide with the Constitution and The Rule of Law in the United 
States. 
CONCLUSION 
Rejecting dispute mechanisms in multilateral trade agreements 
does not constitute opposition to free trade. Trade between and 
among countries is never fully free. It is a matter of degree. Interna-
tional trade is always managed trade-- that is managed by separate 
sovereigns or some international organization. The degree of free-
dom and the volume of trade lies within the trade agreement and the 
mechanism(s) for enforcing the agreement. That power lies either 
with each of the sovereigns or with some superintending institution. 
The U.S. court experience with the so-called “dormant com-
merce clause” makes the point. Although often difficult to discern, 
a difference does exist between a state’s laws, the purpose of which 
are to protect in-state interests, and state laws having a legitimate, 
non-protectionist purpose, but which inhibit some trade from out-
side the state. From the viewpoint of out-of-state corporations, the 
non-uniformity of laws inherent in the U.S. federal system creates 
countless “trade barriers.” Federal courts, as the superintending in-
stitution, seem to have developed a presumption that strongly disfa-
vors the states under the dormant commerce clause.224 
                                                                                                             
 223 See Ashley Kirk, European Debt Crisis: It’s not just Greece that’s drown-
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It is not unreasonable to expect that international tribunals look-
ing at non-tariff trade barriers will follow along a similar path. From 
an international perspective, the U.S. and other countries often view 
each other’s laws that differ from their own as non-tariff “trade bar-
riers.” The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act225 “elim-
inated the 1974 Act’s distinction between tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers, and with it, some of the special considerations for trade 
measures impacting consumer protection, employee health and 
safety, labor standards, and environmental standards.”226 When in-
ternational trade DSMs decide these issues, they are resolving mat-
ters that should be decided by U.S. courts. 
It should not surprise lawmakers that many Americans have a 
sense that “We the People” are losing our powers of self-govern-
ment in extremely complex international trade agreements. Ordinary 
Americans do not pretend to understand the intricacies of trade law 
and negotiations, as indeed few lawyers understand. They do expect 
their representatives to protect U.S. laws enacted through constitu-
tional processes from being undone by international bodies. 
The impasse over Chapter 10 (formerly Chapter 19) dispute res-
olution mechanism concerns self-governance, a term often simply 
equated with “Sovereignty.” The two are not coequal, however. 
Each of the countries in USMCA has given up what might seem to 
be a relatively small amount of its self-governing powers. Canada 
and Mexico each certainly wants to preserve its own national sover-
eignty, especially vis-a-vis the United States. From their perspec-
tives, on the one hand, USMCA’s dispute settlement mechanism 
may somewhat limit the self-governing powers of each country. But 
on the other hand, those dispute settlement procedures easily allow 
parties to block access by opponents to U.S. federal courts. Canada 
and Mexico gain more than they give up in terms of self-governance. 
In terms of U.S. self-governance, USMCA’s dispute settlement 
mechanisms are a complete negative. Its DSMs and the interpreta-
tions that were sometimes necessary from the NAFTA Free Trade 
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Commission227 constitute supra-constitutional governing mecha-
nisms. As such, they necessarily conflict with the Constitution. No 
other country in the world has as well-considered a constitution as 
that of the United States. The Constitution’s innovative protections 
for trade and investment have proven to be key to U.S. economic 
success. Those who would transplant a few of those innovations to 
supra-national bodies fail to realize or ignore that the mechanism 
they may consider “effective” requires other elements of our Con-
stitution in order to actually be effective. 
USMCA not only allows U.S. nationals to be denied access to 
U.S. courts without their consent,228 it is also a far inferior substitute. 
It may purport to provide a neutral and fair process, but NAFTA did 
not and the USMCA cannot provide “independent judges.”229 With-
out the salary and tenure protections that define what it means to be 
an “independent judge,”230 the unconsented-to process is offensive 
to the constitutional sensibilities of U.S. citizens. If aware of what 
the dispute settlement mechanism does, most U.S. citizens would 
oppose it regardless of how great the promised trade benefits.231 
NAFTA and the Treaty for the European Union expanded mul-
tilateralism in trade and governance.232 Support for NAFTA and the 
World Trade Organization benefited from the enthusiasm, at the 
                                                                                                             
 227 NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission is comprised of representatives from 
the three member countries including Canada’s Minister of International Trade, 
the United States Trade Representative, and Mexico’s Secretary of the Economy. 
 228 U.S. nationals can lose their right of access to any court in the U.S. if they 
consent to an arbitration agreement. 
 229 See Bucholtz, supra note 77 (proposing that binational panel members be 
granted the salary and tenure protections of Article III judges in order to make 
them more “independent”). 
 230 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 231 Senator Elizabeth Warren (D. Mass) and former Ambassador John Bolton 
make similar arguments in opposition to international trade agreements. Compare 
Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Op-
pose, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-
partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-
e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.75ab19300770, with John Bolton, Trump, 
Trade and American Sovereignty, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-trade-and-american-sovereignty-
1488931180. 
 232 See generally, Nicholas Baggaley, Trade Liberalization under the GATT, 
the NAFTA and the EU, J. OF COMPA. INT’L MGMT. (1998). 
56 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 
 
time, for a “New World Order.” The hopes inspired by the EU, how-
ever, have faded. Brexit, the wave of refugees, and the several debt 
crises have demonstrated that the current confederal arrangement is 
not a stable structure. EU enthusiasts, therefore, have been advocat-
ing greater integration and attempting - so far unsuccessfully - to 
create a constitution. The purpose of a constitution would be to cre-
ate a state, having at least external sovereignty. Slowly, EU integra-
tionists have been learning by experience the wisdom of the political 
principle laid down in The Federalist that confederations, useful for 
certain purposes, do not work as governing arrangements.233 
The USMCA, as a multilateral agreement was almost not com-
pleted. At one point, the U.S. divided the negotiations, dealing bi-
laterally with Mexico without Canada. President Trump said that 
negotiations were going well with Mexico, but not Canada.234 
Consciously or not, the Trump Administration’s strong prefer-
ence for bilateral trade agreements, over multilateral ones, is consti-
tutionally more prudent. Even better would be bilateral treaties, for 
reasons discussed above.235 Bilateral agreements normally do not 
create governing bodies. In CUSFTA, the U.S. hastily agreed to the 
binational panels as an interim agreement. 
Opposition in the U.S. to multilateral trade agreements that in-
clude governing mechanisms is not necessarily motivated by isola-
tionist or anti-free trade views. Admittedly, some U.S. citizens who 
oppose multilateral trade agreements do so for self-interested and/or 
isolationist reasons. General opposition, however, to any multilat-
eral agreement which includes supranational governing institutions, 
such as NAFTA and the WTO, can legitimately represent a defense 
of U.S. self-governance under our Constitution. U.S. sovereignty, 
and promotion of fully free, bilateral trade are easily compatible.236 
Those who work for institutionalized global governance of trade 
have not learned the lessons of how and why the “American Exper-
iment” has succeeded so well. As Justice Kennedy has written, “The 
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Framers split the atom of sovereignty [so that] our citizens would 
have two political capacities, one state and one federal.”237 Few U.S. 
citizens are interested in having a third political capacity, which is 
global. 
                                                                                                             
 237 U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
